The 14th Amendment Disqualification Cases against Trump Are Too Little & Way Too Late

The Colorado Supreme Court was clearly right to reverse the lower court’s silliest error: The President is obviously an “office” covered by the 14th Amendment’s disqualification clause.
But let’s tap the brakes on all this premature celebration. I wish I could say that it would make a difference, but it’s more likely to backfire, like the Manhattan DA indictment backfired (Trump’s polling spiked immediately, and notice how Bragg has been eager to delay his weak case as long as possible).


The Supreme Court is likely to reverse Colorado, and it will probably be right – at least on prudential grounds. The history and facts are not clear enough to warrant such a late intervention. If the evidence of Trump participating in an “insurrection” (rising to the level of the 14th Amendment’s text and context) were clear, case should have been brought much earlier.

To be clear, Alan Rozenshtein and I have argued here that Trump’s “overt acts” conduct – on top of his Jan 6 speech – could constitute criminal incitement and obstruction, distinguishable from protected First Amendment speech. But we also acknowledged these problems are challenging, and the meaning of “insurrection” circa 1860s is especially difficult and contested by serious scholars.

In part because the facts, the history, and the precedents were unclear, the plaintiffs had to wait, and then waited too long, when the party nomination process would be over by the time appeals would be heard, much less decided. It’s like a “Purcell principle,” (don’t change districting or voting rules too close to an election), as applied to candidates’ disqualifications if the challengers waited too long and their delay created the timing problem.

Trump is a dire threat to democracy, but this case isn’t so great for democracy, either. Sorry.

Author: Jed Shugerman

Jed Handelsman Shugerman is a Professor and Joseph Lipsitt Scholar at Boston University School of Law. He was at Fordham Law School 2013-2022. He received his B.A., J.D., and Ph.D. (History) from Yale. His book, The People’s Courts (Harvard 2012), traces the rise of judicial elections, judicial review, and the influence of money and parties in American courts. It is based on his dissertation that won the 2009 ASLH’s Cromwell Prize. He is co-author of amicus briefs on the history of presidential power, the Emoluments Clauses, the Appointments Clause, the First Amendment rights of elected judges, and the due process problems of elected judges in death penalty cases. He is currently working on two books on the history of executive power and prosecution in America. The first is tentatively titled “A Faithful President: The Founders v. the Unitary Executive,” questioning the textual and historical evidence for the theory of unchecked and unbalanced presidential power. This book draws on his articles “Vesting” (Stanford Law Review forthcoming 2022), “Removal of Context” (Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 2022), a co-authored “Faithful Execution and Article II” (Harvard Law Review 2019 with Andrew Kent and Ethan Leib), “The Indecisions of 1789” (forthcoming Penn. Law Review), and “The Creation of the Department of Justice,” (Stanford Law Review 2014). The second book project is “The Rise of the Prosecutor Politicians: Race, War, and Mass Incarceration,” focusing on California Governor Earl Warren, his presidential running mate Thomas Dewey, the Kennedys, World War II and the Cold War, the war on crime, the growth of prosecutorial power, and its emergence as a stepping stone to electoral power for ambitious politicians in the mid-twentieth century.

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